

SPECIAL REPORT

National Legal and Policy Center

Why Unions Promote Mass Immigration:

Behind Organized Labor's Interest-Group Alliances

Carl F. Horowitz

INTRODUCTION

It was solidarity time inside the great hall along Chicago's Navy Pier last July. The AFL-CIO was holding its 50th-anniversary convention. And the right of illegal immigrants to remain in the U.S. was a top priority. At points throughout the proceedings, federation leaders such as AFL-CIO President John Sweeney, and marquee guest speakers including Rev. Jesse Jackson and Sen. Ted Kennedy, peppered their presentations with appeals to Congress to legalize the immigration status of millions of "undocumented" workers—in other words, to create an amnesty.

Apparently disregarded was the fact that Congress nearly 20 years earlier had created such a program, and that the result was more of the very conditions the law was intended to eliminate. Yet speaker after speaker, cheered on by hundreds of delegates, delivered the writ. The survival of the labor movement depends on legalizing, and



organizing, illegal migrant workers. We need them and they need us. Let us bring them out from the shadows of the underground economy and into the sunshine of full acceptance as fellow Americans. Let us never forget that a cabal of exploitative employers and

right-wing Republicans are conspiring to stand in the way of this happy outcome. So ran the script.

Such sentiments were set against a backdrop of schism. A recently-formed rump faction, the Change to Win (CTW) coalition, dissatisfied over ostensibly insuf-



ficient attention to organizing, boycotted the event. Two key member unions, the Service Employees International Union, or SEIU, with 1.8 million members, and the Teamsters, with 1.4 million members, in short order announced they would leave the AFL-CIO altogether. By the end of the week they were joined by the United Food and Commercial Workers, with their 1.4 million members. Two months later, in late September, CTW's now seven-union roster met in St. Louis to announce its arrival as a full-fledged federation.

Given the rancor surrounding the split, it might be easy to view the two federations as bitterly divided, and organized labor on its last legs. But any death knell would be premature. The schism, first and foremost, is over strategy and rhetoric, not beliefs. And this *especially* is true on the matter of immigration.

Change to Win's driving force, SEIU President Andrew Stern, for years has

argued, as has Stern's former mentor, AFL-CIO President John Sweeney, that a key ingredient of organizing is expanding immigration from current levels. They share the view that persons here illegally, whether by way of unauthorized entry or overstay of a temporary visa, should have their status adjusted to legal residency. "The struggle of immigrant workers is our struggle," Sweeney has remarked on more than one occasion. For Stern, immigration reform means "standing shoulder to shoulder with business" to enable as many immigrants as possible to work here, while defending their workplace rights through aggressive organizing.

The clash between the two federations is over cause and effect in the service of a common goal. The AFL-CIO sees lobbying, research and education as necessary to ensure a favorable climate for organizing. Change to Win, by contrast, views massive organizing as a prerequi-

site for making lobbying, research and education effective. Yet each federation thinks alike in terms of desired outcomes. If anything, Change to Win has more reason to support high levels of immigration, as its Service Employees, United Food and Commercial Workers, and UNITE-HERE¹ unions represent mainly unskilled workers in labor-intensive industries. It is the unions in Change to Win, not the AFL-CIO, which are positioned to organize a sizeable number of low-wage, foreign-born employees of Wal-Mart, Tyson Foods, Cintas, Roy Rogers and Taco Bell. And it is the AFL-CIO, by contrast, where one finds unions representing steel, auto and airline workers who now with depressing regularity are bracing themselves for announcements from their respective employers of pension plan termination—assuming they already haven't received the bad news yet.

Service Employees President Andrew Stern speaks; Teamsters President James P. Hoffa looks on.



AP/Wide World Photos

Unions, by their nature, seek to maximize membership. Yet by the same token, they seek the most favorable terms possible in contract negotiations. The two goals—membership and bargaining power—may conflict, especially when the skill level of newcomers to the labor market is low. When the supply of labor is rapidly rising, it is more difficult to maintain job security through collective bargaining, even with successful organizing.² And nothing expands a workforce like mass immigration.³

It may be difficult to fathom, but there actually was a time in our nation's history when unions recognized this, and accordingly, were at the forefront of persuading Congress to restrict immigration. Organized labor's metamorphosis into mass-immigration cheerleaders—seemingly at odds with its own best interests—is a story that is at once fascinating and disturbing.

SETTING THE STAGE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Organized labor was a latecomer in its support of mass immigration. For well over a century, unions had been averse to it. Their leaders believed that immigrants—especially the desperate among them—were willing to accept wages, benefits and working conditions that most native-born Americans would not. In large enough numbers, they argued, immigrants could pose a threat to union bargaining power, even as they potentially stood to enlarge membership. Even in the labor movement's earliest years, predating the formation of the American Federation of Labor in 1886, unions such as the Glass Bottle Blowers' Association, the Horse Nail Workers' Union, and the Retail Clerks Protective Association petitioned Congress to restrict immigration.⁴


Such fears have been borne out by extensive research. "(E)very serious study over the past 100 years," notes

Cornell University labor economist Vernon Briggs, "has found that wages are depressed by immigration, the adverse impact being most severe for unskilled workers."⁵ A sizeable volume of published research over the last dozen years, particularly by Harvard's George Borjas, likewise has concluded that the least educated and skilled among the native-born are the most susceptible to job displacement by unskilled immigrants.⁶

Support for large-scale immigration, then as now, consisted of an alliance of (wage-minimizing) employers and (vote-maximizing) ethnic politicians. But unlike today, labor leaders explicitly had opposed this alliance. In 1912, union officials supported legislation in Congress that would have required literacy tests for immigrants; the measure passed, but President Taft vetoed it. They supported similar legislation a couple years later, only to have President Wilson likewise apply his veto pen.⁷ American Federation of Labor founder Samuel Gompers cautioned that organizations opposing immigration restrictions for ostensibly "sentimental" or "idealistic" reasons in fact had received financial support from business organizations.⁸ Sound familiar? In a letter to Congress dated March 19, 1924, Gompers wrote:⁹

America must not be overwhelmed (by immigrants) . . . Every effort to enact immigration must expect to meet a number of hostile forces and, in particular, two hostile forces of considerable strength. One of these is composed of corporation employers who desire to employ physical strength . . . at the lowest wage and who prefer a rapidly revolving labor supply at low wages to a regular supply of American wage earners at fair wages. The other is composed of racial groups in the United States who oppose all restrictive legislation because they want the doors left open for an influx of their countrymen regardless of the menace to the people of their adopted country.

Congress did pass restrictive legislation in that fateful year of 1924, strengthening temporary national-origin quotas it had enacted three years earlier. If the



Samuel Gompers, founder of the American Federation of Labor.

new law met with opposition from labor leaders, it was because it didn't go far enough. A. Philip Randolph, black civil-rights pioneer and future president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, for example, had sought zero immigration.¹⁰

For four decades the restrictions benefited organized labor and the rest of America. As first- and second-generation immigrants assimilated, many of them joined unions, and without having their bargaining position weakened by subsequent large-scale waves of newcomers. Briggs lays out a strong case that the two trends—the rise of unionism and the decline in immigration—were of a piece. "The cessation of mass immigration over these years, made it easier for the third-wave immigrants and their descendants to become assimilated and for the process of social elevation to occur," he notes.¹¹ Unions served as a vehicle for assimilation by immigrants, affirming to them and their children that America represented the future. Union membership, having sharply declined during 1920–24, rose again with strict immigration limits now on the books. With the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 (upheld by the Supreme Court two years later),¹² membership exploded in the years during and after World War II. By 1965, union membership in the non-

agricultural U.S. labor force had reached an all-time high of nearly 18.3 million.¹³

Yet political support for loosening immigration restrictions had grown during this time, even after passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the basis for modern immigration law. And immigration proponents hit the jackpot in 1965, when Congress amended the act. Led by Sen. Philip Hart, D-Mich., and Rep. Emanuel Celler, D-N.Y., lawmakers scrapped national-origin quotas in favor of a hemispheric quota system, and made family reunification the main basis for admission. In so doing, Peter Brimelow recounted in his book, *Alien Nation*,¹⁴ the legislation wound up raising immigration levels, despite repeated assurances by its advocates that it would do no such thing. Total annual legal immigration over the following decade rose from about 300,000 to 400,000. The application of the Eastern Hemisphere preference system to the Western Hemisphere (1976) and the combination of hemispheric ceilings into a worldwide quota (1978) contributed to further yearly increases to 500,000 and beyond.

There also was a hidden problem in all this—illegal immigration. And this would loom ever larger in public opinion. Legal and illegal immigration, by their nature, are mutually reinforcing. That is, as more people come here legally, there is a greater propensity of family, relatives and friends back home to join them, even if by illegal means. To be sure, sending-nation "push" factors such as war, poverty and corruption matter, as do receiving-nation (i.e., American) "pull" factors such as economic opportunity and religious freedom. But in the end, kinship and friendship ties matter more. Center for Immigration Studies Executive Director Mark Krikorian sums up: "No one wakes up in Timbuktu and says, 'Today I will move to Milwaukee!'—migration takes place by way of networks of relatives, friends, acquaintances, and fellow countrymen, and few people immigrate to a place where these connections are absent."¹⁵



U.S.-Mexico border crossing; a picture is worth a thousand words.

Revisions to immigration policy unwittingly facilitated illegal immigration; likewise, Congress recognized, further revisions had the capacity to disrupt it. In 1978, lawmakers created a commission to study the problem. The 16-member panel, headed by Notre Dame President Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, released its final report on March 1, 1981, several weeks after President Reagan took office,¹⁶ recommending a series of measures designed to end illegal immigration, while ensuring an ample supply of labor, especially for agricultural growers. One measure that would not work, the commission concluded, would be an updated version of Operation Wetback. In that instance, President Eisenhower in 1954 had ordered a roundup and deportation of hundreds of thousands of illegal Mexicans, many

of whom had arrived here legally under the Bracero guest worker program, which would last another decade. Successful as Operation Wetback was, this time around, with far more people to deport, a similar effort would be both a logistical and public-relations disaster. But the commission did recommend intermediate enforcement steps, such as a national ID card and more aggressive Border Patrol enforcement, to stem the tide of illegal migration from Mexico.

In March 1982, Sen. Alan Simpson, R-Wyo., and Rep. Romano Mazzoli, D-Ky., introduced legislation to enable illegal immigrants already here to obtain legal resident status, while discouraging further illegal entries. But this and a subsequent Simpson-Mazzoli measure stalled, with interest groups finding the contents

unacceptable in one way or another to wield veto power.

Unions, to their credit, initially opposed the amnesty component. "Illegal workers take jobs away from American workers and they undermine U.S. wages and working conditions," the AFL-CIO had declared in 1981.¹⁷ It would prove to be organized labor's last hurrah in affirming a longstanding position of immigration restriction. Over the course of roughly a half decade, union resistance to amnesty wore down. Whereas labor chieftains began by opposing amnesty outright, they shifted to a view that amnesty was acceptable as long as employers in the future faced penalties for hiring illegal workers. Finally, in 1986, Congress broke the impasse, especially over whether to legalize the status of farm workers. And on November 6, 1986, President Reagan, politically weakened by the Iran-Contra revelations, signed the measure, known as the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), just two days after the Democrats had triumphed in Congressional elections.

IRCA, stripped to its essence, was a political swap: amnesty for employer sanctions. The amnesty portion of the equation made illegal immigrants, from whatever country, eligible for a phased-in adjustment of legal status if they prove: 1) continuous residence in the U.S. prior to January 1, 1982; or 2) employment in perishable agriculture for at least 90 days during the 12 months prior to May 1, 1986. An award of amnesty, though not automatic, would be highly likely.

The application process for amnesty began on May 5, 1987, by little coincidence Mexico's Cinco de Mayo Day. The program worked—at least from the standpoint of most participants. Some 2.7 million of 3.1 million applicants, about three-fourths of them Mexican, had been granted Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status by the time the program had run its course in the early

90s.¹⁸ As if to affirm the power of radical immigrant pressure groups, Congress in 2000 passed "late amnesty" legislation for the benefit of those applicants who had been unsuccessful the first time around, granting legal status to all illegal aliens part of lawsuits claiming continuous residence in the U.S. prior to 1982.¹⁹ All told, Congress created six separate general or nation-specific amnesties in the post-1986 period.

The employer sanctions portion of the IRCA deal, however, was a different story. At least it looked good on paper. By law, most U.S. employers now had to verify, by means of a new "I-9" form, that job applicants were eligible to work in the United States; any employer who knowingly hired illegal immigrants would be subject to civil or criminal penalties. But the sanctions, even during the early years only sporadically enforced, became practically irrelevant as time passed. Whereas in 1992 the federal government levied 1,063 fines on employers for hiring illegal aliens, by 2002 that number had declined to 13—a 99% drop!²⁰

Aside from manpower limitations, there are several explanations for the laxity of enforcement. First, an underground fake ID industry arose to accommodate illegal workers. The General Accounting Office (since renamed the Government Accountability Office) on more than one occasion has uncovered evidence of widespread document fraud.²¹ The activity certainly managed to keep the Immigration and Naturalization Service busy; in one month alone in 1998, INS agents seized nearly two million counterfeit documents in Los Angeles.²² And in an analysis of IRCA applications, the Social Security Administration concluded that many immigrants either had used legitimate IDs belonging to family or friends, bought bogus cards from unscrupulous operators, or invented their own nine-digit numbers.²³ Employers were hardly innocent in all this. Princeton sociologist Alejandro Portes observed several years ago:²⁴

Predictably, an entire industry of fraudulent papers has emerged. Would-be workers at construction sites and similar places often are told to go get "their papers" and return the next day. Through such subterfuges, firms demanding low-wage labor have continued to receive a steady supply, thus guaranteeing their profitability.

Second, INS agents have not been allowed to do their job because of heat placed on their agency by lawbreaking employers and politicians friendly to them. In 1998, INS raids on Georgia's Vidalia onion fields during harvest season caused illegal workers to flee. Within days, both of that state's U.S. Senators and three of its House members sent an angry letter to Attorney General Janet Reno denouncing "the lack of regard for farmers."²⁵ The INS soon backed off, promising in its place a more benign method of enforcement. In 1999 INS launched Operation Vanguard, targeting Nebraska's illegal immigrants working in meatpacking plants by reviewing employee records and interviewing workers. Of the plants' 24,000 employees, the INS estimated that about 4,000 were illegal, with 3,000 of the latter confirmed as such.²⁶ Nebraska elected officials and industry people alike were infuriated. Then-Republican Governor Mike Johannis, along with Sens. Chuck Hagel (R) and other state political figures, quickly swung into action on behalf of meatpackers and ranchers, successfully pressuring the Justice Department to halt the operation.²⁷ Apparently, "nice" enforcement cut no more ice with immigration enthusiasts than onsite raids had. Observers such as former INS official Robert Bach²⁸ and immigration law expert Peter Schuck²⁹ later admitted outright that the agency lacked the resources to monitor the hiring of illegals.

Third, illegal immigrants have access to what amounts to legal fake identification provided by their own country: *matricula* cards readily obtainable from any one of roughly four dozen Mexi-

can consulates located throughout the U.S.³⁰ These cards can be applied to a wide range of functions, from opening a bank account to applying for a driver's license to obtaining credit. Only the hopelessly naive believe that legal immigrants, who by definition hold valid U.S. documents, need such a card. *These cards are meant for illegal immigrants.* Major airlines and banks in this country, not to mention hundreds of local law enforcement agencies, now accept the matricula card, which are issued on a same-day basis and are not secure, rendering them susceptible to fraud. Aside from an erosion of respect for sovereignty, the widespread acceptance of the card is due to capitulation to aggressive lobbying by the Mexican government and allied pressure groups here, particularly the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF).

IRCA's amnesty-for-sanctions compromise, in essence, proved to be a political bait-and-switch—and immigration enthusiasts have won hands down. It is a mark of their unrelenting drive for power that these activists now demand the repeal of the nearly toothless employer sanctions. Supporters of legal mass immigration had continued to score victories all the while. Congress in 1990 raised the legal immigration ceiling by roughly 40%, while creating a new "diversity" visa lottery to enable up to 50,000 newcomers from "underrepresented" nations each year to enter this country as permanent residents.³¹

It was no small surprise that, the intent of IRCA notwithstanding, illegal immigration continued to climb as well. Whereas in the mid 1990s the Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated the annual net increase at about 275,000,³² by the early part of the current decade, the increase averaged 400,000 to 500,000 a year. The Pew Hispanic Center's most recent report on illegal immigration in the U.S., issued in March 2006, estimated that about

11.1 million unauthorized immigrants lived here as of March 2005, up from 4 million in 1986. Of the more recent total, 56% came from Mexico and another 22% originated from elsewhere in Latin America. Illegals constituted 30% of the total foreign-born population.³³ Our nation was back to square one—if not back further.

Union officials, having jettisoned their opposition to illegal immigration, now recognized a golden opportunity. Here was a large and growing pool of migrant workers, unorganized and often exploited by employers in the face of a steady decline of organized labor's share of the labor force. Whereas nearly a third of America's total non-farm work force had been unionized during the 1950s and early 60s, after the 1965 legislation that figure gradually fell to its current 12.5%. Within the private sector, the share of workers belonging to unions fell to its current level of slightly below 8%. For many unions, such as the Teamsters, decline could be measured in absolute numbers.

Labor already made clear it would stand with immigration enthusiasts. In 1987, just one year after IRCA's enactment, the AFL-CIO joined a lawsuit to stop the Immigration and Naturalization Service from imposing employer sanctions for most of the year. Now the unions needed new leadership to complete its 180-degree transition.

ENTER THE SWEENEY ERA


The Bronx-born John Sweeney was raised in a hothouse of Irish-ethnic labor progressivism. During the 1950s, while in college, he joined his first union, a forerunner of the Service Employees. In 1976 he assumed the leadership of New York City's SEIU Local 32B, and four years later became president of the international union.

Sweeney sought to remake the SEIU into a model for organizing and political activism. And realizing that goal

required confrontational tactics. In 1985 he and his top aides concocted an idea for an agitprop campaign to bring the battle directly, and loudly, to the doorsteps of hotels and other major service employers. Beginning in Denver and spreading to cities nationwide, the campaign, dubbed "Justice for Janitors," was classic in-your-face organizing. At various points, overwhelmingly Hispanic demonstrators blocked sidewalks and traffic, shouted abusive language, and shook metal-filled canisters at ear-splitting volumes. Infuriating as such tactics were to countless pedestrians and motorists, Service Employees locals won settlements in city after city, dramatically boosting membership in the process. The campaign sent a clear message to labor officials throughout America: The future lies south of the border.

By 1995, Sweeney was now the logical heir to AFL-CIO leadership. The Republican Party had scored huge victories in the previous year's elections, and controlled both houses of Congress. Labor officials saw a mortal threat to workers' rights; a growing number of them saw longtime federation President Lane Kirkland as having outlived his usefulness. Though Kirkland had announced he would run for re-election, mounting opposition from officials loyal to Secretary-Treasurer Thomas Donahue forced him out. Donahue, though at first somewhat reluctant to run, announced his candidacy. In August the AFL-CIO executive council selected him to serve as interim president. But in the eyes of the more militant unions, Donahue had limited credibility because of his ties to Kirkland. Sweeney was their man.

Sweeney, along with his New Voice slate, intended to deliver. At the federation convention in October 1995, Sweeney defeated Donahue, winning the support of unions representing 57% of rank-and-file membership. To retain the loyalty of Donahue supporters, the convention expanded the



John Sweeney, president of the AFL-CIO.

AFL-CIO executive council from 33 to 54 members, offering the new seats to previously unrepresented unions. The move had the effect of nearly doubling representation of women and minorities on the council.

Once in office, Sweeney swiftly went about completing the transformation of the AFL-CIO into an aggressive advocate for mass immigration. American workers, he and allies claimed, were not undermined by a huge influx of Third World newcomers. "The notion that immigrants are to blame for the deteriorating living standards of American low-wage workers must be clearly rejected," read an AFL-CIO policy resolution under the new regime. The federation proceeded to work with ethnic and business activists to strip pending immigration reform in Congress of key provisions, such as mandatory Social Security number verification and stricter limits on refugee admissions, effectively contradicting sound research and recommendations by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.³⁴ Though not without merit, the resulting law, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, was seriously watered down from what its sponsors had envisioned.

In February 2000 the AFL-CIO Executive Council issued a state-

ment demanding repeal of all IRCA employer sanctions and supporting amnesty for all illegal workers regardless of their length of time in this country. Undocumented workers should be welcomed, as they have made "enormous contributions to their communities and workplaces."³⁵ Far from being an opportunistic flip-flop, this statement represented the culmination of a political realignment nearly two decades in the making.

AN INTEREST-GROUP TRIUMVIRATE: LABOR, BUSINESS AND ETHNIC ACTIVISTS

If organized labor's classic opposition to mass immigration flowed mainly from self-interest, so did its reversal. Whereas only a couple decades earlier, illegal and unskilled Mexican, Salvadoran, Lebanese and Filipino workers were competitors for union jobs, by now they had morphed into a great untapped resource, the very future of the Labor Movement. And it remains, for the most part, untapped. Recent research on the California labor force, for example, has concluded that less than 10% of foreign-born workers, particularly Mexican, in key labor-intensive industries belonged to a union.³⁶

Andrew Stern, John Sweeney and other top union officials intend to raise such percentages dramatically. There are now an estimated 11.5 million to 12 million illegal immigrants in this country, 7.2 million of them gainfully employed.³⁷ Unions, they argue, must join employers and ethnic politicians in that endeavor, becoming part of the very alliance of which Samuel Gompers had warned against many decades earlier. There were, of course, other influential pressure points favoring mass immigration; philanthropies, church groups, college-admissions officials and media all have done their part. The role of the Ford Foundation, which in the late 60s provided substantial seed money for MALDEF and the National Council of La Raza, in particular cannot be underestimated.³⁸ But the primary focus of this section is on the triangle of labor, business and ethnic activists. For their entrenched interrelationships best explain why achieving reform has been so difficult, despite the growing crescendo among Americans that Congress "do something already" about immigration.

Relationship #1: Unions and Business

Business groups are committed as ever to ensuring a surplus of workers, all the better to minimize wages and benefits. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and the National Restaurant Association each support some form of normalization of immigration status for illegal workers and oppose even mild cuts in legal immigration ceilings. Randel Johnson, the Chamber of Commerce's vice president on labor and immigration issues, reacting favorably to the unveiling of the Bush administration's guest-worker plan in January 2004, noted, "We need a system of 'earned targeted adjustment' for undocumented workers that fill vital roles in the economy, which would enable them to achieve legal status."

EXHIBIT 1

Selected Occupations in U.S. with High Concentrations of Illegal Immigrants (March 2005)

Occupation	% Workers Who Are Illegal
Insulation workers	36%
Miscellaneous agricultural workers	29
Drywall/ceiling tile installers	28
Butchers/meat & poultry workers	27
Groundskeeping/landscaping	25
Construction laborers	25
Brick/stone masons	25
Dishwashers	23
Maids & housekeepers	22
Graders & sorters, agricultural produce	22
Painters	22
Cement masons & finishers	21
Cleaning/washing equipment operator	20
Computer hardware engineers	20
Proportion of all U.S. workers who are illegal	4.9%

Source: Jeffrey S. Passel, *The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.: Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey*, Research Report, Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, March 7, 2006. Significantly, the aggregate figure of 4.9% is up from 4.3% a year earlier.

Even employees in the information-technology (IT) sector, whose jobs require far higher skill levels than janitors, construction workers or landscapers, are affected by this principle. Business groups have made spurious claims of an IT worker shortage to persuade Congress to boost existing annual caps on H-1B residency visas for such employees from abroad. The evidence strongly indicates that the program's primary function, at least in practice, has been to enable employers to underpay foreign-born recipients relative to American workers with similar skills and experience.³⁹ Yet that hasn't stopped Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates from stating of the opposition to mass immigration, "It's very dangerous. You can get this idea the world is very scary; let's cut back on travel . . . let's cut back on visas."⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the National Association of Manufacturers is pressuring Congress to exempt foreign-

born recipients of Master's and Ph.D. degrees from U.S. universities from annual immigration caps.

Unions may continue to rail against "big corporations," but the two are partners in promoting immigration representing a wide range of skill levels, and with an eye toward global labor markets.⁴¹ Such an alliance is logical. Employers see such immigrants as a way to cut labor costs. These are workers who are unlikely to demand much in the way of wages, benefits and working conditions, especially if hired "off the books," thus sparing the employer the burden of payroll or income taxes.⁴² Unions, for their part, see these workers as future rank-and-file members. As guest workers, they would not be likely to contribute to union benefit funds; that is why labor leaders lean toward full legalization with a "path" to citizenship. As for employers, they may be less than happy about

acceding to union demands, but they can take solace in the fact that large numbers of future (low-wage) immigrants stand ready to be hired. That why they pay trade association lobbyists the big bucks.

It is instructive that Change to Win's Andrew Stern sees Alfred P. Sloan, who built up General Motors during its formative decades, as a prime model for union organizing—at least as much as Sloan's union contemporaries such as John L. Lewis and Walter Reuther. Stern believes that maximizing organizational efficiency is necessary to successful management and organizing. His advocacy, for example, of consolidating smaller unions into larger ones was a key reason for his split with Sweeney. Along with the Teamsters' James P. Hoffa, Stern often makes overtures to Republicans, cautioning Democrats not to take the labor vote for granted. The GOP-leaning business sector, no doubt flattered over such talk, is more than pleased to join forces on immigration.

In few places has this labor-business partnership been more evident than under the aegis of the influential pro-immigration group, National Immigration Forum. In April 2002 the Washington-based NIF sponsored a conference, "a potent alliance" in its words, of union, business, civil-rights, immigration-advocacy and religious leaders. AFL-CIO President John Sweeney had this to say about the search for common ground on immigration issues:⁴³

The message we deliver today to the President and the Congress is not only that we must get back to work, but that this is an even more important time for America to stand behind its principles. The attacks of September 11 and their aftermath, including increased fear and scapegoating of immigrants and the great burden imposed on immigrants by the recession, force this nation and our leaders once again to ask of ourselves, 'Which side are we on? . . . What do we stand for?' We must stand in unequivocal solidarity with immigrant workers and their families.

Thomas Donohue, (not to be confused with Thomas Donahue, Sweeney's AFL-

CIO predecessor), president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a founding member of the Essential Worker Immigration Coalition, weighed in with this statement:⁴⁴

The reality is, millions of undocumented workers are here who fill an economic need, and we can't afford to send them home. The sooner we fold them into an expanded immigration system the better for all concerned . . . Security is an argument for—not against—fixing our immigration system. We need to recognize the hard-working immigrants who deserve protection under our laws, while exposing criminal gangs and terrorists that use the current system to their advantage. A regulated, structured system will do this.

If ever two statements better represented the convergence of labor and business on immigration, one would be hard-pressed to find them. Sweeney appears to view scapegoating of immigrants in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (a "scapegoating" wholly of his own imagination, one might add) as more egregious than the attacks themselves. For him, the truest expression of our nation's ideals is bringing as many immigrants into the work force as possible, without regard for the consequences. Donohue at least is willing to admit the obvious—that dangerous people from abroad have taken advantage of our system. But the real issue, he notes, is the necessity of granting immigrants full protection under law, effectively ignoring distinctions between legality and illegality—note his use of the word "expanded."

The mantra that immigrants take jobs that otherwise would go unfilled is the driving assumption behind this alliance. When President Bush unveiled his guest worker proposal in January 2004, he urged Congress to "legalize the process of people doing jobs Americans won't do." The President merely was reciting conventional and misleading wisdom. More accurately, immigrants accept jobs that Americans *won't do at offered levels of wages and benefits*. To the extent that an opening for a drywall hanger at \$9 an hour without benefits is likely to be filled by an immigrant, it is because a native-

EXHIBIT 2

Percentage of Immigrant Groups Using at Least One Welfare Program By Country/Region of Origin, 1996 and 2001		
Region/Country of Origin	1996	2001
Mexico	33.1%	34.1%
Caribbean	32.8	31.2
Central America	26.4	25.8
South America	18.0	20.7
Eastern Europe	18.9	18.8
Middle East	20.0	18.5
East Asia	16.7	17.5
South Asia	7.5	13.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	24.6	13.5
Western Europe	9.1	10.0
Canada	11.2	6.3
Not reported & Oceania	14.6	13.8
All immigrants	21.9	22.7
Native-born Americans	15.3	14.6

Source: Steven A. Camarota, "Back Where We Started: An Examination of Trends in Immigrant Welfare Use Since Welfare Reform," Background, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, March 2003, p. 13. The programs in question are the Earned Income Tax Credit, cash assistance, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, and Medicaid. Program participation rates reflect usage by any member of the household. The author relied on data from the Census Bureau's *Current Population Survey*.

born construction worker will not accept less than something on the order of \$12 an hour plus health insurance. But there's the rub. Employers, knowing that hiring illegal aliens has become a virtually risk-free proposition, are more than willing to fulfill the prophecy of "jobs Americans won't take." From their standpoint, they prefer to hire immigrants, including illegal ones, from Mexico or El Salvador. And from the standpoint of the migrant workers, \$9 an hour is far higher than what they would be making back home. Construction laborers, like groundskeepers, maids and dishwashers, work in occupations that now contain unusually high proportion of illegal workers in the labor force. (See Exhibit 1.)

For employers, such workers constitute "cheap labor." For taxpayers, they are anything but cheap. With mass immigration has come mass eligibility for the Earned Income Tax Credit, Medicaid, hospital cost reimbursements, food

stamps, bilingual education and other forms of public assistance. The incidence of dependency upon these programs as a whole is higher for immigrants, indeed much higher for Mexican arrivals, as indicated in Exhibit 2.

Business and labor form an arms-length agreement. Business seeks to minimize labor costs by hiring immigrants. Labor in effect responds, "You hire them, and we'll organize them." And business in turn responds, "We don't mind if you organize them because immigration policy ensures a nearly bottomless reservoir." Like two rival crime families, business and labor share an innate mutual distrust, yet they can "do business." Mass immigration serves the purposes of each. That is why they work together to maintain and expand the post-1965 framework of immigration policy. When each says the word "reform," they mean bringing as many illegal immigrants as possible into

the regular work force, thus encouraging further immigration.

In those instances where employers and labor square off in a prolonged dispute over immigrant workers, it is surrounding communities that pay the highest price. During the early 90s, for example, Case Farms, Inc., a poultry producer currently based in Salisbury, Md. (under its new name Case Foods, Inc.), was faced with a "shortage" of workers—that is, a shortage of workers willing to start at less than \$7 an hour, and under unsanitary and dangerous working conditions.⁴⁵ The company decided to look south of the border to hire for its processing plant in Morganton, N.C., a town of about 15,000 population some 50 miles east of Asheville.⁴⁶ It sent 15 passenger vans to recruit migrant workers in Florida, and spread the word in Texas and Florida that it was hiring. The word especially got out to a large network of native Guatemalans. Case Farms was not about to object, as such workers less likely than the native-born to complain, join a union or balk at taking on dangerous, messy tasks. Within several years about 90 percent of the 550 workers at the plant were Hispanic, the vast majority of them Guatemalan.

The work was extremely hard, with a factory floor chilled to 45 degrees to keep the meat from spoiling. Workers were permitted only three bathroom breaks during a full shift. One day, three workers complained about working conditions, and refused to return to the butchering line until their concerns were addressed. Case Farms management fired them on the spot and had them arrested for trespassing. The next Monday, 300 workers walked off the job and struck the plant for several days. Word of the strike quickly reached the Laborers union, which had been trying to organize two Perdue Farms plants in northeastern North Carolina. The workers voted to be represented by the union. But after a full decade of strikes, lawsuits and negotiations, the Laborers early this decade

abandoned its costly campaign in favor of a two-year commitment to fund a local center to aid Case Farms workers.

Meanwhile, area population composition had changed. In 1990, the Census Bureau reported that there were less than 300 Hispanic persons in Morganton and surrounding Burke County out of a total population of around 75,000. By mid-decade the Hispanic portion had jumped to an estimated 2,000 to 4,000, if not higher. The rapid influx of barely literate, non-English-speaking Guatemalan highlanders (whose predominant native tongue, in fact, was not Spanish, but Mayan) had placed severe strains on local government service capacity. Local officials suddenly had to grapple with the need for interpreters in the courts and bilingual instructors in the schools. Local government-funded housing and health care costs rose, and many migrants lived in (subsidized) trailers and public housing. A good many native-born at the bottom of the career ladder, especially blacks, found themselves locked out of a job. "If an American goes in and applies for a job and a Guatemalan goes in after him, they're going to hire the Guatemalan before they hire the American," said a former plant worker.⁴⁷

Even without a pitched employer vs. union battle, immigration may impose a high cost on a locality. In Garden City, Kansas, with several meat-processing plants, managers prefer to hire Hispanic and Southeast Asian workers, since their wage demands are less. As a result the community's local government has been barely able to cope with explosive growth in police, education, hospital and other public service costs.⁴⁸

In all fairness, most employers in this country operate within the law. Yet many face arbitrary discrimination suits from MALDEF and other groups for allegedly failing to hire a sufficient percentage of Hispanics. That puts them in a bind where they feel they have to hire Hispanic immigrants. That in turn triggers an influx of illegal immigrants

into the work force, especially driven by rampant ID fraud. From the employers' standpoint, it makes sense for their trade associations to lobby Congress to legalize the status of illegal immigrants, who are likely to remain in this country one way or another anyway.

But even without that external pressure, law-abiding employers can be expected to act more in their own interests than in the interests of the country. And by linking with unions and ethnic shakedown artists, they are laying the groundwork for an enlarged welfare state. Someone, after all, is going to have to take care of the many immigrants who neither will return to their country of origin nor become economically self-sufficient. The result will be higher taxes for education, health care, food stamps, housing and other necessities. Such are the costs of achieving workplace diversity.

Relationship #2: Business and Ethnic Groups

Ethnic-identity politicians, most significantly Mexican, play a much larger role now than they did in 1965. Ever ready to organize rallies, hold press conferences and file lawsuits, organizations such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the National Council of La Raza, and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) at every turn have sought to block immigration reform. Moreover, they have closely aligned themselves with employers in an odd Bad Cop-Good Cop relationship, hectoring and shaking down potentially recalcitrant corporate officials, while periodically praising them for their progress in achieving workforce diversity.

One of the more deceptively powerful immigration and affirmative-action pressure groups is the Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility (HACR). The group makes it a point to "remind" major companies of their duty to hire appropriate (i.e., higher) percentages of Hispanics for board membership and

high-ranking executive positions. "Hispanics are underrepresented in the boardrooms of Corporate America," HACR stated in a press release on the eve of its 10th anniversary symposium dinner in June 2002. "Hispanics hold only 1.7 percent of board seats and less than 1 percent of all executive positions in Fortune 1,000 companies." And who were the sponsors of this event? Here's a partial list: Verizon, Daimler-Chrysler, General Motors, IBM, Intel, Philip Morris, AOL Time Warner, Ford Motor Company, Allstate, Anheuser-Busch, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, McDonald's and Coca-Cola. HACR Coalition member organizations putting the heat on these and other companies included the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, LULAC, the National Hispanic Employee Association, the National Council of La Raza, and the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities.

The timid response by corporate executives, ever ready to forge "partnerships" with such organizations, is both predictable and dismaying. It has become virtually a ritual for CEOs to proclaim their respective company's "excellent record on diversity," while solemnly announcing zero tolerance for those in their ranks refusing to do their part to promote it. Far from resisting the ethnic activists, major employers have been accommodating to a fault. McDonald's, for example, wears its accolades from MALDEF and other ethnic radicals on its sleeve. In 2003, after *Fortune* magazine had ranked it as "the top company to work for in the U.S." in its annual evaluation survey of corporate sensitivity to ethnic-group aspirations, the company's response revealed how easily flattery works. "We strive to develop and maintain a diverse workforce that will strengthen the McDonald's system," said (Cuban-born) Ralph Alvarez, executive vice president and chief operations officer for McDonald's USA. "We are proud of our longstanding commitment to our employees, our suppliers and the ideal

of reflecting the diverse communities we serve."⁴⁹ Toyota sponsors a Hispanic Scholarship Fund for graduating seniors through its Puerto Rican subsidiary. And AT&T, Freddie Mac, Gateway, Verizon and Coca-Cola in 2004 each served as sponsors of the Hispanic Associations of Colleges and Universities' Capitol Forum and Summit on Diversity.

What if corporations don't fulfill their implied quota? And what if they wish to acquire a stake in a Mexican company? Either way, they can score points by contributing to their potential accusers' coffers. The list of MALDEF donors in particular bears watching. The foundation's 2003-04 annual report lists Anheuser-Busch as having given at least \$100,000, making it the only corporation (plus roughly a dozen foundations and associations) to occupy this rarified level. It shouldn't be too shocking therefore that Vilma Martinez, MALDEF President during 1973-82, has sat on Anheuser-Busch's board of directors continuously since or that Anheuser-Busch Vice President for Sales Development Jesus Rangel is listed as a member of the MALDEF board of directors.⁵⁰ Nor should it be surprising that the company owns a 50% stake in Grupo Modelo, the Mexico City-based brewer of Corona beer.⁵¹ In the \$50,000-\$99,999 donors' club are AT&T, Bank of America, General Motors and SBC Communications, each a proponent of "workplace diversity."

Another, more painful alternative is the lawsuit. A targeted company would be wise to settle early, as the retail clothing chain, Abercrombie & Fitch, recently found out. In June 2003 MALDEF, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Asian Pacific American Legal Center, and the law firm of Lief, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein⁵² filed suit in federal court in San Francisco on behalf of nine young "students of color" who allegedly had been refused sales jobs, or terminated from them, on the basis of race or ethnicity. The case originated with a single plaintiff in 1999, but had

grown to epic proportions once civil-rights activists and their legal beagles scented a gold mine. Joining in the suit were the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the law firm of Minami, Lew & Tamaki LLP, and a team of East Coast firms led by Kohn, Swift & Graf in Philadelphia. In November 2004 Abercrombie & Fitch capitulated, agreeing out of court to pay \$40 million to Latino, African-American, Asian-American and female applicants who had charged the company with discrimination. The settlement, approved by U.S. District Judge Susan Illston, also required the company to institute "benchmark" goals for minority hiring, hire 25 recruiters to seek out such employees, and institute corporate diversity training. "This agreement promises to transform this company, whose distinctiveness will no longer stem from an all-white image and workforce," boasted MALDEF Vice President of Litigation Thomas A. Saenz.⁵³

The point of all this, of course, is to send a message to all of corporate America: "You could be next." The comingling of ethnic nonprofit groups and corporations will continue so long as the latter sees surrender with a smiling face as less costly than fighting. The corporate-ethnic "partnership" is based on intimidation. This intimidation, ironically, is at cross-purposes with the business community's search for low-wage employees. The growing share of the labor force of foreign-born Hispanics and other nonwhite minorities may seem to be a source of "cheap" labor. Yet that labor can get mighty expensive when companies are faced with lawsuits, boycotts, or both, at the hands of ethnic tormentors. Remember, *the mere threat of a boycott* by Jesse Jackson brought Toyota to a 10-year, \$7.8 billion affirmative-action settlement (a surrender that company officials spun as a "comprehensive rededication to diversity and inclusion"). Likewise, MALDEF, whose operating style derives in large measure from Jackson, knows that bad publicity

can bring results against a corporate target. In mass-immigration politics, where every grievance is trumped up as a "civil-rights" issue, surrender is the name of the game. Corporations see it as just another cost of doing business. Unfortunately, they are unwilling to confront the reality that the cost keeps getting higher.

Relationship #3: Unions and Ethnic Activists

Union leaders have become close partners with ethnic activists, willfully oblivious to the latter's goal of balkanizing America into ethnic principalities, with Mexicans taking the lead. There is no surprise in this, and for three reasons. First, MALDEF and similar pressure groups keep the flow of immigrants at high levels, with the promise of more to come. That means more potential union members and dues collections. Second, labor and ethnic activists, each proponents of a hard-Left egalitarian worldview, view Third World immigrants as *victims*, useful raw material in a coalition of "people of color" pressing overdue claims against American society. Finally, despite overtures made by the GOP to key labor and civil-rights leaders, unions and racial-ethnic activists remain the muscle of the Democratic Party.⁵⁴ Given the party's leftward shift for well over 30 years, unions have had little choice but to move left as well.

They know how to put together rallies and campaigns. In August 2003, the AFL-CIO issued a statement, "In Support of Immigration Reform." Among dozens of signers were the Teamsters, the Operating Engineers and other unions, plus a farrago of national and local non-profit activist groups such as MALDEF, the Mexico Solidarity Network, the Hispanic Farmers Association of El Paso, the Tennessee Immigrant Rights Coalition and the National Lawyers Guild's National Immigration Project. The statement supported "a fair and realistic process to provide an adjustment of status for undocumented workers" and opposed

"the expansion of existing temporary non-immigrant worker programs or the creation of any such new programs at this time." That's as clear an endorsement of amnesty as anyone could have made without using the dreaded "a" word.

The labor-ethnic alliance produces more than press releases and manifestos. They march and fight together, especially when May Day rolls around. On May 1, 2001, for example, a 700-person-strong march in Boston brought out John Sweeney along with the Massachusetts chapter of the AFL-CIO. Sweeney left no doubt as to where he and his federation stood. "Undocumented workers should not live in fear," he said. "We are united. The only thing that is just is a general amnesty."⁵⁵ In Los Angeles that day about 1,500 marchers demonstrated down Wilshire Boulevard to demand amnesty for "undocumented" workers. Organized by the Multi-Ethnic Immigrant Workers Organizing Network, the rally had a union presence. "The majority of janitors have to work in the darkness of their undocumented status," said Mike Garcia of the Service Employees union. "We will lead the nation in the fight for legalization."⁵⁶ Similar rallies that day took place in New York City, Chicago, San Diego and other cities.

Such events, needless to say, barely have scratched the surface. In October 2003 Sweeney welcomed illegal aliens and their political hired guns to a pro-amnesty "freedom ride" in New York, with a bus convoy converging upon Liberty State Park across the river in New Jersey. The Massachusetts chapter of a labor-backed group, Jobs with Justice, has been trying to persuade that state's legislature to pass a bill enabling illegal immigrant college students to pay in-state tuition; nine states already have laws allowing this. The AFL-CIO's Farm Labor Organizing Committee opposes guest-worker programs because they tie workers to a single employer on less than favorable terms. Sweeney and other AFL-CIO top brass

are committed to full and unconditional amnesty.⁵⁷

The reality is that wherever ethnic radicals can be found supporting mass immigration and amnesty, union officials can be found fighting with them. An ad hoc Hispanic activist group, the National Alliance for Human Rights, has been organizing a March on Washington to pressure the Senate to pass amnesty legislation and overturn legislation passed by a 239–182 margin in the House of Representatives. The measure is called the Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437). Sponsored by House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner, R-Wisc., and Rep. Peter King, R-N.Y., the measure, among other things, would subject illegal immigrants here to criminal penalties and set aside funds to construct 700 miles of high-security fencing along the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border. The bill, significantly, did not include a guest worker provision.

More than 500 mass-immigration advocates met in Riverside, California to map out a strategy against the bill. The group's spokesman, Armando Navarro, professor of ethnic studies at the University of California at Riverside, promised "massive mobilization, activism and political participation to countervail the heinous, racist and nativist crusade" of those who support the bill.⁵⁸ In addition, the foreign ministers from 11 Latin American countries met in Cartagena, Colombia in February, agreeing to lobby the Senate to reject the bill—so much for respect for U.S. sovereignty. Some radical ethnic activists seem to smell blood—literally. Here are the words of one Jose Angel Gutierrez, a professor at the University of Texas, Arlington, and founder of the La Raza Unida political party: "We have an aging white America . . . They are dying . . . We have got to eliminate the gringo, and what I mean by that is if the worst comes to the worst, we have got to kill him."⁵⁹

Organized labor seemed more than ready to help such activists, as the Sen-

ate took up the pending legislation. On March 25, Mexican ethnic provocateurs, egged on by local Spanish-language DJs, held a 500,000-strong rally in downtown Los Angeles to intimidate lawmakers into passing amnesty legislation. Providing "security" for the L.A. rally was none other than SEIU Local 1877, which represents janitors. The Service Employees local, noted the *Los Angeles Times*, also coordinated the movement of more than 100 buses originating from throughout California and other southwestern sites.⁶⁰ Also organizing the rally were such immigration-advocacy groups as the Central

American Resource Center, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, and the Pomona Day Labor Center. Radical Hispanic activists also held major rallies that month in Chicago, Miami, San Diego and other cities.

The pressure, at least for now, culminated on Monday, April 10, with dozens of rallies across the nation. A combined million or more persons took to the streets in Los Angeles, Dallas, Phoenix, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, San Francisco, and smaller communities with visible migrant populations such as Garden City, Kan. and Lake Worth, Fla., to

register their disapproval over any possibility of deportation. Marchers in Washington, for example, swept onto the National Mall by the tens of thousands, waving American flags and chanting, in Spanish, "Here we are, and we're not leaving." As of this writing (mid April), radical activists are planning boycotts and strikes for May.

The Service Employees played a central role in organizing the rallies, including the one in Washington. "I think part of the message that is being sent to members of Congress and both political parties is that people are organized and they're paying attention," said SEIU spokeswoman Avril Smith.⁶¹ Likewise, Amelia Frank-Vitale, a protest organizer with UNITE-HERE, remarked: "I do believe the last series of events really changed the discourse in Washington from being solely about enforcement to issues of humanity. Today, most legislators are back in their home towns. These marches speak to them. We're not going away."⁶²

Organized labor officials know more immigrants mean more political clout and dues collections, even if in the long run the country is made worse off. The AFL-CIO wrote all members of Congress urging them to vote against H.R. 4437, arguing it will harm the native-born as well as immigrant workers. Likewise, the SEIU and other Change to Win unions have worked closely with the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, the National Council of La Raza, and People for the American Way toward this end. There is no mystery in this. A grant of Lawful Permanent Resident status to as many illegal aliens as possible would more dues collections and benefit-plan contributions. Moreover, should these immigrants graduate from LPR to full-fledged U.S. citizen status, they would be eligible to vote. Evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the foreign-born, especially Hispanics, vote Democratic⁶³—the party, in other words, of organized labor.

Organized labor, in short, isn't bashful about promoting mass immigration

A recent pro-amnesty rally in Los Angeles.



as being in the welfare of the nation. It's unfortunate that the nation in question happens to be Mexico.

AMNESTY WITHOUT END

Amnesty is the culmination of the immigration-without-consequences mentality, for it operates with barely any pretense of delineating between legality and illegality. As such, "amnesty" is a very unpopular word with the American people right now.⁶⁴ The Bush administration, for one, claims to oppose amnesty. Yet its guest-worker plan lacks effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure recipients of renewable "temporary" three-year visas return home. The Government Accountability Office recently projected that the enforcing agency, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, would not have a fraud-management system in place until 2011.⁶⁵ All of this adds up to an amnesty, if not in name then in fact. It is also a good reason why in the more than two years since its introduction the Bush plan has gotten little support in Congress.

It is a leap of faith to believe that untold numbers of guest workers qualifying for residence here will decide to go home once their time limit is up. Certainly, as University of California, Davis economist Philip Martin argues persuasively, such had not been the case with our experiences under the old Bracero farm worker program nor has it been the case with the current H-2A farm worker visa, which resembles a guest worker program by allowing U.S. farmers anticipating labor shortages to recruit temporary foreign workers.⁶⁶

The H-2A visa, a product of the 1986 IRCA legislation, like its immediate H-2 predecessor, actually was well-designed. But the legal and political pressures to transform it into a de facto amnesty program caused many well-meaning participating growers to throw in the towel. Radical nonprofit legal groups funded by the federally-chartered Legal Services Corporation for years have seen

to that. The program was heavily used by farmers, especially in Eastern states, with labor-intensive crop harvests. Tightly regulated by the Labor Department in terms of wages, working conditions, and visa deadlines, the program sought to ensure that workers would promptly return home after the work was done. The hitch was that LSC-funded lawyers, plus unions and Hispanic activists, eager to use guest workers as political cannon fodder, opposed the program tooth and nail. As they saw it, once migrant workers arrive here, they deserve to stay permanently. These radical "anti-poverty" activists looked under every rock to find technicalities to render the program inoperative, and had no qualms about blitzing growers with nuisance lawsuits.

Rael Jean Isaac, in a book published by the National Legal and Policy Center, *Harvest of Injustice*,⁶⁷ provides numerous cases of Legal Services lawyers, often working in tandem with unions and ethnic organizations, filing frivolous complaints against honest small- and medium-sized growers, imposing on them potentially crippling legal bills. Making things worse was that large growers tended to side with their tormentors, seeing an opportunity to drive their competitors out of business. One exasperated West Virginia apple grower asked: "Is it justice for us to lose everything we have over issues Legal Services has found to use to litigate?"⁶⁸ The result of LSC's nuisance-litigation strategy has been a permanent, and illegal, presence in the U.S. by a great many "temporary" farm workers—all the better to grant them amnesty later on.

The experiences of European countries, Germany in particular, ought to serve as a warning of the difficulty in averting unintended consequences of a guest worker program. Most of the migrants from other countries who worked in (West) Germany's post-World War II *Gastarbeiter* program did *not* return home. If anything, family members came to join them. That is

why despite the government's termination of the program in 1973, Germany experienced an 82% hike in the number of its foreign-born residents between that year and 1999.⁶⁹ And the foreign-born, particularly the Turks, have not assimilated.⁷⁰ Many live in physical and linguistic enclaves; even many of their children (and grandchildren) do not speak German. The unemployment rate among Berlin's Turkish population has been estimated as high as 35%. Crime rates for the second- and third-generation offspring are far higher than for ethnic German youths. More ominously still, Turkish youth in Berlin have grown receptive to Islamic fundamentalism, seemingly more so than their compatriots back in Istanbul or Ankara. Carried to its extreme, this growing separatism might lead to something similar to the two-week orgy of arson and looting that befell France in the fall of 2005; many of the rioters were the sons and grandsons of 60s-era guest workers from Islamic Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

Even assuming assimilation is easier here than in Europe, it is a salient feature of mass immigration, and amnesty in particular, that each wave begets another. There is no one "final" amnesty, merely a period of respite before the next one. Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington for this reason terms immigration a "self-enhancing" process. He elaborates:⁷¹

(S)ustained high levels of immigration build on themselves. Immigration reinforces immigration. Once one group has come, it's easier for the next group, and then for subsequent groups. Immigration is not a self-limiting process, it's a self-enhancing process. Also, particularly in this country, the longer immigration continues the more difficult politically it is to stop it. Immigrants themselves . . . are not necessarily overwhelmingly in favor of more immigrants coming in . . . but by and large, they tend to favor it. Certainly the leaders of immigrant organizations and interest groups do. They have a vested interest in expanding their own constituency. And hence, as immigration continues to enjoy political support, organizational support for it also mounts and it becomes more and more difficult to limit or reshape it.

Reversal, in the context of contemporary American politics, is especially difficult. Numbers USA's Roy Beck observed a decade ago: "Those few groups that stand to lose money, power, or prestige with a cut in immigration wield tremendous power on Capitol Hill . . . The majority of members of Congress previously earned their living in self-employed occupations or as executives; they think like employers who love a labor surplus instead of like most Americans who depend on paychecks and benefit from tight labor markets."⁷² These words ring true today, despite the urgency for reform created by the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Labor unions have become a prime example of an interest bloc that stands to lose money, power and prestige if immigration were curbed to pre-1965 levels. At the same time their leaders should be considered apart from individual members. In a 2001 nationwide Zogby poll taken not long before the attacks, 60% of union households thought amnesty to be either a "bad" or "very bad" idea.⁷³ This mirrors a very recent *Time* magazine poll showing that 63% of respondents from all walks of life considered illegal immigration a "very serious" or "extremely serious" problem.⁷⁴

Even assuming they are not clueless, labor leaders simply cannot be counted upon to respond favorably to criticism on this issue. They have too much to gain as participants in a political triumvirate with ethnic multiculturalists (sharply Left-leaning) and businessmen (slightly Right-leaning). And like multiculturalists and employers, they are adept at getting their opponents to capitulate, as the SEIU's Justice for Janitors campaign and MALDEF's pay-us-now-or-you'll-see-us-in-court-later fundraising style have made clear.

Labor officials see immigrants as crucial to institution-building. "We're always looking for opportunities for people to join unions. That's our number-one reason for working with immigrants," noted AFL-CIO spokeswoman Kathy Roeder a few years ago.⁷⁵

Jim Gleason, a Colorado-based United Brotherhood of Carpenters chieftain, defends his union's outreach program to illegal immigrants this way: "If you want to grow, you have to represent the people who are doing the work." In his state, the UBC's share of construction jobs has plunged from about 70% to 10% over the past three decades. About 15 years ago roofer James Hadel videotaped Hispanic immigrants at Kansas City-area construction sites with the intent of getting the illegal ones among them deported; today, as a vice president of the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, he's trying to organize as many as possible.⁷⁷

This strategy may make sense in the short run for unions, but in the long run it is deeply counterproductive. By encouraging perpetual, or "rolling" amnesty as an organizing strategy, unions will find their collective-bargaining clout substantially diminished even as their numbers rise—unless, of course, they would prefer to see employers go bankrupt or (as in the case of the public sector) taxpayers leave for another jurisdiction. Ninety percent of all future job openings in the fastest-growing sectors of our economy, estimates the U.S. Department of Labor, will require some form of post-secondary training or education.⁷⁸ Exactly how do unions expect to retool themselves as a mighty voice in the New Economy by focusing their organizing on millions, potentially tens of millions, of unskilled, poorly-educated immigrants from Mexico and other Third World countries, possessed of limited English-language proficiency and increasing virulence of Mexican (or other anti-American) nationalism? It's a losing proposition. *What has changed, in other words, are not organized labor's interests, but the ability and willingness of its leaders to recognize them.*

On the issue of immigration, union officials have become virtually unaccountable to the public or even to their own members. They cannot seem to fathom that organized labor's now-abandoned

position on immigration was rooted in common sense, if from a self-interested standpoint. Unions back then were not motivated by "bigotry" or "xenophobia," but by an understanding that restriction was good for their members. It is a legacy to which today's union leaders must return. Unions answer to the working men and women of this country. And nothing could be more contrary to the interests of working Americans than the erosion of living standards, rule of law and sovereignty that is mass-immigration's baneful bequest. Unfortunately, such a view isn't likely to be voiced at any AFL-CIO or Change to Win convention in the near future. ■

Carl F. Horowitz is the director of the Organized Labor Accountability Project of the National Legal and Policy Center, a Falls Church, Va.-based nonprofit group dedicated to promoting ethics and accountability in American public life.

NOTES

¹ UNITE-HERE was created in 2004 by a merger of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE).

² For research lending support to this tendency, albeit to varying degrees, see, for example, George J. Borjas, *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 19-38; Joseph G. Altonji and David Card, "The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of Less-Skilled Natives," in *Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market*, John Abowd and Richard B. Freeman, eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 201-234; Robert J. LaLonde and Robert H. Topel, "The Assimilation of Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Market," in *Immigration and the Work Force: Economic Consequences for the United States and Source Areas*, George J. Borjas and Richard B. Freeman, eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 67-92.

³ The term "mass immigration" in this report refers not just to immigration on a large scale, but also to an attitude that discounts any possibility that immigration has a downside. Mass-immigration enthusiasts typically disdain and even ridicule those who question the ability of a host nation to absorb large numbers of newcomers, particularly from radically dissimilar cultures, in a relatively short time. That is why immigration *momentum* is a more important marker here than either absolute number or percentage share. What makes our nation's present situation ominous is not just the high percentage of immigrants as a proportion of the total U.S. population (12.1% in March 2005, according to the Census Bureau's *Current Population Survey*), but the growing and now-widespread perception that immigration is out of control, and that our leading institutions, such as Congress, corporations and the media, refuse to exert leadership in dealing with the problem—assuming they even see a problem. For a good recent overview of the changing immigration picture (as well as the source of the 12.1% figure), see Steven A. Camarota, "Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America's Foreign-Born Population in 2005," Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, December 2005. See the center's Web site at <http://www.cis.org> for its reports.

⁴ For evidence, see National Archives, Center for Legislative Archives, Records of the Senate Committee on Immigration, <http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-immigration.html>.

⁵ Quoted in "Labor Sells Out U.S. Workers," *Middle American News* (Raleigh, N.C.), December 2003, www.manews.org/1203laborsells.html.

⁶ George J. Borjas, Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F. Katz, "How Much Do Immigration and Trade Affect Labor Market Outcome?," Washington, D.C.:

Brookings Institution, *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Vol. 1, 1997; George J. Borjas, *Heaven's Door*, pp. 62-86; George J. Borjas, "The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November 2003, pp. 1359-68. See also David A. Jaeger, "Skill Differences and the Effect of Immigration on the Wages of Natives," Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Working Paper No. 273, December 1995; Barry Edmonston and James Smith, *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration*, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997. Evidence suggests that this tendency was in force at the turn of the previous century. According to one study, in absence of large-scale immigration that occurred after 1890, urban real wages would have been 34% higher in 1910. See Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *The Impact of Mass Immigration on American Labor Markets Prior to Quotas*, Working Paper No. 5185, Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995.

⁷ Congress included a literacy test provision in its landmark 1917 immigration law. Again, President Wilson vetoed the bill. But this time Congress had the necessary two-thirds majority in both houses to override the veto.

The provision, as it turned out, did not have the expected impact, in large measure because special schools were established in foreign countries, such as Italy, to teach peasants the fundamentals on how to pass it. See Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., *Immigration and American Unionism*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 79.

⁸ Briggs, *Immigration and American Unionism*, pp. 78-79.

⁹ Quoted in "Labor Sells Out U.S. Workers." Gompers started out as a supporter of relatively unencumbered

immigration. Yet by World War I and its aftermath, he had shifted in his view. In other words, Gompers came to admit something that today's labor leaders will not even consider; namely, that immigration has negative as well as favorable consequences.

¹⁰ "This country is suffering from immigration indigestion," Randolph remarked at the time. See Briggs, *Immigration and American Unionism*, p. 120.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹² *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel*, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

¹³ Briggs, *Immigration and American Unionism*, p. 113.

¹⁴ Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster*, New York: Random House, 1995, pp. 74-91. Urging passage of the bill, a young Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., denounced as "highly emotional, irrational and with little foundation in fact" fears that the measure would increase immigration or change the nation's ethnic mix in any appreciable way. He was proven wrong on both counts. See Brimelow, pp. 76-77.

¹⁵ Mark Krikorian, "Flawed Assumptions Underlying Guestworker Programs," Background, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, February 2004, p. 1.

¹⁶ Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, *U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981.

¹⁷ Quoted in John Tuason, "Friends of Immigrants?: The AFL-CIO, Past and Present," *Labor Watch*, December 2003, p. 2. *Labor Watch* is a monthly publication of the Capital Research Center, a nonprofit watchdog group based in Washington, D.C.

¹⁸ See Brimelow, *Alien Nation*, Appendix 2, p. 285.

¹⁹ The legislation, known formally as the Legal Immigration and Family Equity (LIFE) Act, had its origins in a deal brokered by the Clinton White House, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and House Speaker Dennis Hastert. LIFE would allow previously unsuccessful applicants/plaintiffs to reapply for amnesty during the one-year period June 1, 2001-May 31, 2002. The period having expired, some unsuccessful IRCA applicants still were left in the lurch—at least until November 2003. That month, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge signed an agreement settling one of the lingering IRCA suits. An additional one-year reapplication period subsequently went into effect May 2004. It is fair to say that all of the original 400,000 unsuccessful applicants, at least those among them still alive and here in the U.S., have managed to secure amnesty.

²⁰ Immigration and Naturalization Service, annual data cited in Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, "Who Left the Door Open?" *Time*, September 20, 2004, p. 59.

²¹ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed to Address Problems*, GAO-02-66, January 2002; *Illegal Aliens: Fraudulent Documents Undermining the Effectiveness of the Employment Verification System*, GAO/T-GGD/HEHS-99-175, Statement of Richard M. Stana, Associate Director, GAO, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, July 22, 1999.

²² Heather Mac Donald, "Crime & the Illegal Alien: The Fallout from Crippled Immigration Enforcement," Background, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, June 2004, p. 9.

²³ Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Immigration Reform and Control Act: Report on the Legalized Alien Population*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992, p. 7.

²⁴ Alejandro Portes, "Immigration's Aftermath," *The American Prospect*, April 8, 2002, p. 35.

²⁵ Mark Krikorian, "Guestworker Programs: A Threat to American Agriculture," Background, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, June 2001, p. 2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Mark Krikorian, "Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement," Background, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, May 2005, p. 3; Krikorian, "Guestworker Programs," p. 2.

²⁸ Quoted in Louis Uchitelle, "I.N.S. Looks the Other Way on Illegal Immigrant Labor," *New York Times*, March 9, 2000. Bach merits special mention as a villain. As chief policy adviser to Clinton-era INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, he did everything possible to thwart the implementation of a database management system authorized by Congress in 1996 intended to alert the agency to foreign students posing a security threat. The program in fact had worked quite well. Yet Bach blocked its further use. Two students who later would become 9/11 hijackers, Hani Hanjour and Mohammed Atta, might well have been arrested beforehand. See Nicholas Confessore, "Borderline Insanity," *Washington Monthly*, May 2002, see website, www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0205.confessore.html.

²⁹ Peter Schuck, "Law and the Study of Migration," in *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield, eds., New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 195.

³⁰ For a full length discussion of the extent of availability and usage of this card, and the alarming implications for U.S. sovereignty, see Marti Dinerstein, "IDs for Illegals: The 'Matricula Consular' Advances Mexico's Immigration Agenda," Background, Washington,

D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, January 2003.

³¹ Legislation sponsored by House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner, R-Wisc. (H.R. 4437), included a provision to repeal the diversity-lottery visa program. But the 239-182 vote in favor of the bill, discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report, was well short of a veto-proof majority. Given the bill's lack of a guest-worker provision and intense opposition by Hispanic activists friendly to the White House, a veto by President Bush appears likely, barring major compromises in the Senate.

³² U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Annual Report: Legal Immigration, Fiscal Year 1997*, p. 197. See also *Immigration Reform*, A Century Foundation Guide to the Issues, New York: Century Foundation Press, 2000, p. 6.

³³ Jeffrey S. Passel, *The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population of the U.S.: Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey*, Research Report, Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, March 7, 2006.

³⁴ See U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy*, Washington, D.C.: Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997.

³⁵ See Tuason, "Friend of Immigrants?" p. 5.

³⁶ Ruth Milkman and Daisy Rooks, "California Union Membership: A Turn-of-the-Century Portrait," in *The State of California Labor*, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 3-37; Ruth Milkman, ed., *Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in Contemporary California*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000; Lisa Catanzarite, *Wage Penalties in Brown-Collar Occupations*, Los Angeles: UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center, Latino Policy &

Issues Brief No. 8, September 2003. While the authors refrain from stating that large-scale Mexican and other Hispanic immigration weakens the economic position of unions and displaces native-born workers, it is difficult to avoid reaching such conclusions.

³⁷ Passel, *The Size and Characteristics of the Immigrant Population*; Edwin S. Rubinstein, "Looking (in vain) for 'Jobs Americans' Won't Do," *vdare.com*, February 23, 2006.

³⁸ The Ford Foundation has provided ideological venture capital, as it were, for a great many far-Left organizations over the past few decades. See Charles Sykes and K.L. Billingsley, "How the Ford Foundation Created Multiculturalism," *FrontPageMagazine.com*, January 9, 2004; William Hawkins and Erin Anderson, "The Open Borders Lobby and the Nation's Security After 9/11," *FrontPageMag.com*, two-part series, January 21-22, 2004.

³⁹ See Paul Ong, ed., *The State of Asian Pacific America*, Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1994, pp. 179-80; U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, "The Department of Labor's Foreign Labor Certification Programs: The System Is Broken and Needs to be Fixed," Final Report No. 06-96-002-03-321; Demetrios Papademetriou and Stephen Yale-Loehr, *Balancing Interests: Rethinking U.S. Selection of Skilled Immigration*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996; Norman Matloff, "On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Nonimmigrant Work Visa in Computer-Related Occupations," *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform*, Vol. 36, Issue 4, Fall 2003, pp. 815-914; Matloff, "Needed Reform for the H-1B and L-1 Work Visas (and Relation to Offshoring)," Davis, Cal.: University of California, Davis, Department of Computer Science, July 24, 2004.

⁴⁰ Cited in Sarah Anderson, "U.S. Immigration Policy on the Table at the

WTO," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, FPIF Discussion Paper, November 30, 2005. See www.fpiif.org.

⁴¹ Julie Watts, *Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization: Unions and Employers in an Unlikely Alliance*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002; *Mexico-U.S. Migration and Labor Unions: Obstacles to Building Cross-Border Solidarity*, San Diego: University of California, San Diego, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper 79, June 2003.

⁴² In income-tax collections alone, the government loses about \$35 billion annually as a result of this "underground" economy for illegal aliens. See Angie Wagner, "Working in the Shadows," Associated Press, reprinted in *Washington Times*, December 4, 2005.

⁴³ Statement of John J. Sweeney, President of the AFL-CIO, "Business and Labor Push for Common Solution to Immigration Question," Washington, D.C.: National Immigration Forum, April 23, 2002. The conference in question was held nearly two weeks earlier on April 11. See NIF's website at www.immigrationforum.org.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Just how dangerous working conditions were at plants in North Carolina's huge poultry-processing industry was something the entire country found out on September 3, 1991, when 25 people died in a fire at the Imperial Food Products facility in Hamlet, N.C. Exit doors, for some reason, had been locked, trapping the victims inside the plant. Nearly 50 other workers were injured in the disaster.

⁴⁶ For summaries of this saga, see Craig Whitlock, "Immigrant Poultry Workers' Struggle for Respect Draws National Attention," *Raleigh News & Observer*, November 30, 1996; Leon Fink, *The Maya of Morganton: Work and Community in the Nuevo New South*, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Caro-

lina Press, 2003; Marcus Stern, Copley News Service, article series, *San Diego Union-Tribune*, November 2-4, 1997, reprinted by the Center for Immigration Studies in Washington, D.C., which presented the series with its 1998 Eugene Katz Award for Excellence in the Coverage of Immigration.

⁴⁷ Quote in Stern, *ibid.*

⁴⁸ Roy Beck, *The Case Against Immigration: The Moral, Economic, Social, and Environmental Reasons for Reducing U.S. Immigration Back to Traditional Levels*, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996, pp. 204-07.

⁴⁹ "McDonald's Tops Fortune Magazine's Sixth Annual List of Companies That Make Workplace Diversity a Priority," *CSRwire*, Corporate Social Responsibility Press Release, July 1, 2003, www.CSRwire.com/article.cgi/1941.html.

⁵⁰ The Capital Research Center lists Rangel as being on the MALDEF board, which has nearly three dozen members. Interestingly, Zoe Baird also is a current member. Baird, if one remembers, was President Clinton's original nominee for Attorney General in 1993, but withdrew her name from consideration in the face of revelations that she and her family had hired illegal immigrants as a chauffeur and a nanny. She admitted she broke the law, and wound up paying \$2,900 in fines. Baird currently serves as president of the New York-based information-technology advocacy group, the Markle Foundation.

⁵¹ See remarks of Peter Flaherty, President, National Legal and Policy Center, "All in the Family: Anheuser-Busch Pays Off the Diversity Activists," Conservative Political Action Conference, Washington, D.C., February 10, 2006.

⁵² One of the partners at that firm was Bill Lann Lee, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division chief for several years under President Clinton.

⁵³ Quoted in "\$40 Million Payment, Detailed Plan for Diversity in Employment Discrimination Suit Against Retail Giant Abercrombie & Fitch," *CSRwire*, Corporate Social Responsibility Press Release, November 17, 2004, www.CSRwire.com/article.cgi/3244.html.

⁵⁴ More than 98% of union political contributions since 1988 have gone to Democrats. See Patrick J. Reilly and John Tuason, "Witnesses to the AFL-CIO's Decline: The Labor Movement's Woes Can't Be Fixed, Experts Say," *Labor Watch*, April 2005, p. 4.

⁵⁵ "May Protests Across the U.S.," *Socialist Worker Online*, May 11, 2001, p. 14.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See David Espo, "AFL-CIO Chief Slams Guest Worker Programs," Associated Press, March 29, 2006. Interestingly, in late March, as Senate debate progressed, Change to Win came out in favor of a guest worker program.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Jerry Seper, "Pro-Immigration Forces to March on Washington," *Washington Times*, February 20, 2006.

⁵⁹ Quoted in Deborah Simmons, "Immigration Talking Points," *Washington Times*, April 14, 2006.

⁶⁰ Teresa Watanabe and Hector Becerra, "How DJs Put 500,000 Marchers in Motion," *Los Angeles Times*, March 28, 2006. See also Ben Johnson, "Who's Behind the Immigration Rallies?" www.FrontPageMagazine.com, March 29, 2006.

⁶¹ Dan Balz and Darryl Fears, "'We Decided Not to Be Invisible Anymore': Pro-Immigration Rallies Are Held Across Country," *Washington Post*, April 11, 2006.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ See, for example, James G. Gimpel and Karen Kaufmann, "Impossible Dream or Distant Reality? Republican Efforts to Attract Latino Voters," Washington, D.C.: Center for Immi-

gration Studies, August 2001; Samuel Francis, "The Myth of the Hispanic Republicans," *vdare.com*, January 23, 2003; Steve Sailer, "Another Nail in the Coffin of Bush's '44% Share,'" *vdare.com*, November 28, 2004.

⁶⁴ For a recent summary of recent opinion surveys revealing the unpopularity of amnesty and other attempts to normalize the status of illegal immigrants, see Tony Blankley, "Mexican Illegals vs. American Voters," *Washington Times*, March 29, 2006; Associated Press, "Polls: Public Concerned About Immigration," March 27, 2006.

⁶⁵ See Stephen Dinan, "Immigration Agency Falters in Handling Fraud Cases," *Washington Times*, March 6, 2006. And when the official report was released, the GAO's conclusions were no less encouraging. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Additional Controls and Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud*, GAO-06-259, March 15, 2006; Bryanna Bevins, "Guest-worker Plan Discredited by New GAO Report," *vdare.com*, March 16, 2006.

⁶⁶ Philip Martin, "There Is Nothing More Permanent than Temporary Foreign Workers," Background, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, April 2001. The H-2A visa came about when Congress in 1986, as part of IRCA, split the old H-2 visa into separate agricultural and non-agricultural components.

⁶⁷ Rael Jean Isaac, *Harvest of Injustice: Legal Services vs. the Farmer*, Falls Church, Va.: National Legal and Policy Center, 1996. At the time, NLPC was based in Vienna, Va.

⁶⁸ Quoted in Isaac, *ibid.*, p. 95.

⁶⁹ Mark Krikorian, "Flawed Assumptions Underlying Guestworker Programs," Background, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, February 2004, p. 5; Martin, *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁷⁰ See Hans-Jorg Albrecht, "Ethnic Minorities, Crime, and Criminal Jus-

tice in Germany," in *Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives*, Michael Tonry, ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997, pp. 31-99; Don Melvin, "The Guest Workers Dilemma," Cox News Service, reprinted in *Washington Times*, July 4, 2004; Martin, *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁷¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "Reconsidering Immigration: Is Mexico a Special Case?" Background, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, November 2000, pp. 4-5. Huntington is the author of a recent book more fully exploring this idea, *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

⁷² Roy Beck, *The Case Against Immigration*, p. 255.

⁷³ See Steven A. Camarota, "Attitudes Toward Amnesty: Zogby Poll Examines Support Among Different Constituencies," Background, Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, September 2001.

⁷⁴ See Nathan Thornburgh, "Inside the Life of the Migrants Next Door," *Time*, February 6, 2006, p. 36.

⁷⁵ Quoted in "Labor Sells Out U.S. Workers." Roeder subsequently would serve on John Kerry's presidential campaign staff in 2004.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Miriam Jordan, "Carpenters' Union Courts Immigrants to Increase Clout," *Wall Street Journal*, December 15, 2005.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ See comments by Elaine Chao, Secretary of Labor, in "Regional Leaders Join Secretary Chao to Launch 13 WIRED Initiatives," *In Focus*, U.S. Department of Labor, February 22, 2006, www.dol.gov.

